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Abstract	The	view	that	quantum	particles	cannot	be	regarded	as	individuals	was	articulated	in	the	early	days	of	the	'quantum	revolution'	and	became	so	well-entrenched	that	French	and	Krause	(2006)	called	it	'the	Received	View'.	However	it	was	subsequently	shown	that	quantum	statistics	is	in	fact	compatible	with	a	metaphysics	of	particle	individuality,	subject	to	certain	caveats.	As	a	consequent	it	has	been	claim	that	there	exists	a	kind	of	underdetermination	of	the	metaphysics	by	the	physics	which	in	turn	has	been	used	to	motivate	a	form	of	'notice'	structural	realism	(Ladyman	1998;	French	2014).	In	this	essay	I	will	review	this	purported	underdetermination	and	the	motivation	for	structural	realism	that	it	purportedly	provides	in	the	context	of	recent	developments	in	both	the	philosophy	of	physics	(specifically	the	work	of	Saunders)	and	metaphysics	(specifically	the	work	of	Dasgupta).	I	aim	to	conclude	that	such	developments	reinforce	the	underdetermination	and	allow	one	to	respond	to	certain	critical	concerns	regarding	its	motivational	power.			
Introduction		As	noted	in	(French	and	Krause	2006)	the	history	of	quantum	statistics	is	the	history	of	quantum	mechanics	itself,	beginning	with	Planck’s	classic	1901	paper	in	which	he	extended	Boltzmann’s	‘Combinatorial’	approach	from	the	statistical	mechanics	of	gas	atoms	to	the	oscillators	of	a	black	body.	However,	in	considering	the	distribution	of	energy	quanta	over	oscillators1,	Planck	used	a	different	form	of	counting	than	Boltzmann,	something	that	puzzled	the	latter’s	student,	Ehrenfest,	among	others.	Clarification	was	only	achieved	years	later	with	the	emergence	of	Bose-Einstein	and	Fermi-Dirac	statistics	and	the	associated	formal	treatment	of	the	counting	involved	(again	see	French	and	Krause	2006,	Ch.	3).	Just	in	case	there	happens	to	be	anyone	reading	this	who	is	not	aware	of	that	difference	between	classical	and	quantum	statistics,	here	is	a	simple	example:	consider	the	distribution	of	two	particles	over	two	energy	states.	In	classical,	or	Maxwell-Boltzmann	statistics,	four	arrangements	are	then	counted:	both	particles	in	one	state,	both	particles	in	the	other	state	and	one	particle	in	each	state	which	is	given	a	double	weight	because	it	was	deemed	that	a	new	arrangement	could	be	formed	by	permuting	the	particles	between	the	states.	The	probability	of	finding	both	particles	in	a	particular	state,	then,	is	¼.	In	the	case	of	quantum	statistics,	crucially,	a	permutation	of	the	particles	is	not	counted	as	yielding	a	new	arrangement.	That	means	for	Bose-Einstein	statistics,	the	probability	of	finding	both	particles	in	a	particular	state	rises	to	1/3;	with																																																									*	Many	thanks	to	Jonas	Becker	Arenhart,	Otávio	Bueno	and	Décio	Krause	for	the	invitation	and	to	Claudio	Calosi	for	helpful	comments	on	an	earlier	draft.	The	responsibility	for	the	outcome	is	entirely	mine	of	course!	1	As	Kuhn	(1978)	notes	it	was	Einstein	who	extended	this	to	the	electromagnetic	radiation	itself	in	the	1905	paper	that	won	him	the	Nobel	prize.		
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Fermi-Dirac	statistics,	of	course,	for	which	particles	are	excluded	from	being	in	the	same	state,	the	probability	is	0.			
The	‘Received	View’:	Quantum	Particles	as	Non-Individuals	The	reaction	from	the	‘quantum	revolutionaries’	was	immediate:	Born	and	Heisenberg	declared	that	the	particles	could	no	longer	be	considered	to	be	distinct	individuals	(again,	see	French	and	Krause	2006,	p.	106)	and	Schrödinger	subsequently	wrote	that	”.	.	.	we	have	.	.	.	been	compelled	to	dismiss	the	idea	that	.	.	.	a	particle	is	an	individual	entity	which	retains	its	’sameness’	forever.	Quite	the	contrary,	we	are	now	obliged	to	assert	that	the	ultimate	constituents	of	matter	have	no	’sameness’	at	all”	(Schrödinger	1996,	p.121)2		 How	did	they	arrive	at	this	conclusion?	One	can	think	of	their	reasoning	as	a	form	of	modus	tollens:	Boltzmann	explicitly	took	as	one	of	the	premises	of	his	approach	the	claim	that	the	particles	–	gas	atoms	in	his	case	–	were	individuals	(French	and	Krause	2006,	Ch.	2)	and	on	that	basis	derived	the	classical	Maxwell-Boltzmann	statistics	as	sketched	above;	as	also	noted	above,	these	incorporated	the	counting	of	permutations	of	particles	between	states;	in	quantum	statistics,	whether	Bose-Einstein	or	Fermi-Dirac,	these	permutations	are	not	counted;	hence	the	particles	cannot	be	regarded	as	individuals.	One	can	also	think	in	terms	of	a	metaphysical	explanation:	just	as	the	explanation	for	counting	permutations	in	the	classical	case	is	that	the	particles	are	individuals,	so	that	for	not	counting	them	in	quantum	statistics	is	that	the	particles	are	not	individuals.			 This	became	the	established	or	‘received’	view	(once	again,	see	French	and	Krause	2006,	Ch.	3),	whether	due	to	the	status	of	its	advocates	or	the	apparently	straightforward	nature	of	the	above	reasoning.	However,	the	nature	of	this	non-individuality	remained	unclear.	At	best,	certain	metaphors	would	be	used:	Post,	in	his	radio	broadcast	that	was	one	of	the	very	few	discussions	of	the	topic	at	the	time	(the	transcript	of	which	was	published	as	Post	1963),	invited	the	listener	to	think	of	two	umbrellas	that,	however	apparently	indiscernible	they	might	be,	could	still	be	discerned	by	some	nick	or	scratch	and	then	insisted	that	quantum	particles	were	indiscernible	in	an	even	stronger	sense.	Hesse	offered	the	example	of	money	in	a	bank	account	(Hesse	1963),	for	which	we	can	say	there	are	£n,	say,	without	being	able	to	point	to	which	specific	£	in	the	bank’s	accounts	ours	correspond	to	(Teller	used	the	same	metaphor	many	years	later;	Teller	1995).3			 Such	metaphors	are	interesting,	not	least	because	they	suggest	that	by	virtue	of	not	being	regarded	as	individuals,	quantum	particles	should	also	not	be	regarded	as	objects,	at	least	not	in	the	sense	that	we	think	of	umbrellas	and	£	coins	as	objects.	This	indeed	was	the	conclusion	also	drawn	by	Cassirer	and	Eddington,	who,	also	noting	the	work	of	Born	and	Heisenberg	(Cassirer	1936,	p.	184;	Eddington	1936),	used	it	to	motivate	their	respective	forms	of	structuralism	(neo-Kantian	in	the	former	case,	‘subjective’	in	the	latter).	Again	reconstructing	and	thereby	reshaping	the	core	of	their	arguments,	we	can	characterise	it	simply																																																									2	There	is,	of	course,	an	issue	of	transtemporal	identity	here	as	well	but	I	shall	not	be	considering	that.	3	There	is	an	issue	here	regarding	the	delineation	of	the	category	‘object’.	Broadly	we	take	it	to	involve	a	certain	form	of	repeatability	and	a	spatio-temporal	profile,	broadly	understood.	(Thanks	to	Claudio	Calosi	for	this;	also	see	Quinton	1973).	
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as	follows:	to	be	an	object,	something	must	be	an	individual;	quantum	particles	are	not	individuals;	hence	they	cannot	be	objects.		Of	course,	that	still	leaves	open	the	question	of	what	they	are,	then	and	Cassirer’s	response	is	famously	captured	in	the	claim	that	if	we	insist	on	talking,	in	everyday	language,	about	electrons	as	objects	–	perhaps	because,	at	that	time,	we	seemed	to	lack	the	logico-linguistic	resources	to	do	otherwise	–	then	we	can	do	so	'only	indirectly',	'...	not	insofar	as	they	themselves,	as	individuals,	are	given,	but	so	far	as	they	are	describable	as	"points	of	intersection"	of	certain	relations'	(Cassirer	op.	cit.).		 		 This	reconceptualisation	of	electrons	as	nodes	in	a	network	of	relations	acts	as	an	entrance	into	the	broader	framework	of	Cassirer’s	structuralism,	according	to	which	‘higher-order’	principles,	such	as	those	pertaining	to	causality	and	symmetry	and	so	forth,	laws	and	specific	measurement	outcomes	are	intertwined	into	a	kind	of	Parmenidean	whole.	Together	with	a	renewed	appreciation	of	Cassirer’s	place	in	the	history	of	twentieth	century	philosophy	has	come	a	reappraisal	of	both	his	and	Eddington’s	contributions	to	the	history	of	structuralist	thought	in	particular	(French	2014	Ch.	4).	Standard	accounts	of	that	history,	with	their	focus	on	the	retention	of	structural	elements	of	theories,	as	represented	by	the	relevant	laws	for	example,	typically	begin	with	Poincaré,	and	perhaps	Duhem,	mention	Russell	and	the	infamous	Newman	problem,	before	passing	through	Maxwell	and	then	ending	with	Worrall.	And	also	typically,	throughout	such	historical	studies,	little	if	any	mention	is	made	of	quantum	physics	–	Worrall	just	mentions	it	at	the	end	of	his	classic	paper	as,	basically,	work	for	the	future	and	although	Russell	does	go	into	more	detail,	in	the	context	of	his	‘upward	path’	(Psillos	2001)	to	structuralism,	his	book	was	written	just	before	the	development	of	quantum	statistics	and	hence	before	what	Cassirer	and	Eddington	took	to	be	their	implication	for	objects	became	clear.	However,	as	Eddington	insisted,	in	his	famous	debate	with	Braithwaite	where	he	reflected	on	Russell’s	account	(French	2014	Ch.	4),	once	those	features	are	taken	on	board,	the	shape	of	the	structuralist	project	becomes	entirely	different.			 Having	briefly	outlined	the	relevant	history,	I	should	emphasise	that,	despite	claims	that	have	been	made	to	the	contrary,	such	features,	in	themselves,	do	not	provide	the	motivation	for	the	form	of	structuralism	that	I	advocate,	namely,	ontic	structural	realism.	And	this	is	for	two	reasons.		 First	of	all,	it	is	not	the	case	that	it	follows	from	the	claim	that	quantum	particles	are	not	individuals	that	they	cannot	be	considered	to	be	objects,	in	the	usual	sense.	This	is	clearly	demonstrated	by	the	development	of	quasi-set	theory	by	Krause	and	his	collaborators	(see	for	example	Krause	2010	and	Arenhart	2017).	Its	application	to	quantum	particles	hinges	on	the	idea	that	we	can	understand	non-individuality	in	terms	of	the	claim	that	self-identity	is	not	well	defined	for	such	particles.	Following	the	quote	cited	above,	Schrödinger	continued,			“I	beg	to	emphasize	this	and	I	beg	you	to	believe	it:	It	is	not	a	question	of	our	being	able	to	ascertain	the	identity	in	some	instances	and	not	being	able	to	do	so	in	others.	It	is	beyond	doubt	that	the	question	of	’sameness’,	of	identity,	really	and	truly	has	no	meaning”.	(Schrödinger	1996,	pp.	121-122).			da	Costa	used	this	to	motivate	the	development	of	a	form	of	non-reflexive	logic,	that	is,	a	logic	where	the	principle	of	identity―<for	all>x	(x	=	x)―is	not	generally	
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valid.	Quasi-set	theory	provides	a	semantics	for	such	a	logic	by	extending	conventional	set	theory	to	cover	statements	of	identity	that	are	not	well	formed	for	all	set	theoretic	axioms.	Within	the	theory	one	can	derive	quantum	statistics	and	it	can	be	extended	further	to	cover	quantum	field	theory	(French	and	Krause	Ch.	9).	The	point	is,	quasi-set	theory	demonstrates	that	we	can	formally	characterize	non-individual	quantum	particles	as	objects	and	so	that	particular	implication	of	quantum	statistics	does	not	compel	us	to	make	the	move	to	structuralism,	as	urged	by	Cassirer	and	Eddington.		 Secondly,	it	is	also	not	the	case	that	it	follows	from	quantum	statistics	that	quantum	particles	must	be	regarded	as	non-individuals.	One	can,	in	fact,	continue	to	regard	them	as	individuals,	a	conclusion	that	was	reached	independently	by	a	number	of	people	(French	1989a;	Huggett	1999;	van	Fraassen	1991).			
Quantum	Particles	as	Individuals	One	way	of	seeing	this	is	to	dig	a	little	deeper	into	the	simple	two-particles-and-two-states	example	given	above.	The	crucial	factor,	as	emphasized	there,	is	the	role	of	permutations	in	determining	the	arrangements	to	be	counted.	This	can	be	captured	mathematically	by	the	permutation	group	and	the	non-counting	of	permuted	arrangements	is	then	accommodated	by	what	is	now	recognized	as	the	permutation	symmetry	of	quantum	mechanics	(see,	for	example,	French	and	Rickles	2003).		If	we	examine	more	closely	the	action	of	the	permutation	group	we	can	interpret	it	as	imposing	accessibility	restrictions	on	the	relevant	Hilbert	space,	such	that	the	space	comes	to	be	divided	into	Bose-Einstein	and	Fermi-Dirac	sectors	(there	are	also	others,	corresponding	to	so-called	paraparticle	statistics	that	do	not	appear	to	be	manifested	in	nature).	Particles	that	occupy	the	Bose-Einstein	sector	–	namely	bosons	–	cannot	transition	into	the	Fermi-Dirac	sector;	that	is,	they	cannot	become	fermions,	nor	vice	versa.	In	other	words,	the	Fermi-Dirac	sector	is	inaccessible	to	bosons	and	likewise,	the	Bose-Einstein	sector	of	Hilbert	space	is	inaccessible	to	fermions	and	it	is	this	restriction	on	accessibility	that	explains	the	change	in	weight	assigned	to	the	relevant	arrangements	between	the	classical	and	quantum	situations	(French	1989a).	This	offers	an	entirely	different	explanation	for	the	difference	between	classical	and	quantum	statistics	and	there	is	no	need	to	invoke	any	form	of	non-individuality.4		 Of	course,	that	does	not	mean	that	the	treatment	of	quantum	particles	as	individual	objects	is	entirely	straightforward.	Consider	the	question:	what	is	the	ground	(to	use	a	fashionable	term)	of	this	individuality?	One	option	would	be	to	go	for	something	like	‘haecceity’,	understood	as	that	which	makes	something	the	thing	that	it	is,	or	primitive	thisness,	which	as	the	name	suggests,	posits	this	
																																																								4	One	can	then	push	the	explanans	back	a	step:	what	is	that	explains	the	accessibility	constraints?	One	option	would	be	to	argue	that	they	are	to	be	explained	in	terms	of	the	nature	of	bosons	and	fermions	respectively	and	given	Dorr’s	claim	that	identity	claims	provide	the	bedrock	of	explanations,	this	would	be	an	appropriate	explanatory	stopping	point	(Dorr	2016;	I	am	grateful	to	Claudio	Calosi	for	suggesting	this).	However,	leaving	aside	the	essentialist	character	of	such	a	suggestion,	this	effectively	yields	different	explanations	for	each	kind	of	particle.	A	more	unificatory	explanation	is	provided	through	the	appeal	to	permutation	symmetry	(French	and	Rickles	2003),	understood	as	a	feature	of	the	structure	of	the	world	(see	later).		
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ground	as	something	primitive.5	From	a	naturalistic	perspective	that	seeks	to	reduce	the	number	of	such	primitive	metaphysical	items	where	we	can,	the	former	might	not	look	like	such	an	attractive	option.	The	latter	is	naturalistically	more	acceptable	insofar	as	nothing	further	is	added,	metaphysically,	over	and	above	the	existence	of	the	individual	concerned.	Still,	a	less	inflationary	alternative	would	be	to	seek	the	basis	for	individuality	in	the	properties	of	the	object,	perhaps	in	the	context	of	the	so-called	‘bundle’	view	of	the	latter	which	takes	objects	to	be	nothing	but	bundles	of	their	properties.	On	this	view,	instead	of	a	metaphysics	of	objects	that	are	individuals,	primitively	or	otherwise,	over	and	above	their	properties,	there	are	only	the	bundles	of	properties.	However,	given	the	multiple	instantiability	of	properties,	Leibniz’s	Principle	of	Identity	of	Indiscernibles	is	typically	then	appealed	to	in	order	to	guarantee	that	no	two	such	objects	can	share	the	same	set	of	properties.			 However,	as	is	now	well-known,	Leibniz’s	Principle	does	not	fare	so	well	in	the	quantum	context	(French	and	Redhead	1988;	Massimi	2001).	Of	course,	if	you’ve	already	decided	to	opt	for	the	non-individuals	package,	then	the	issue	of	the	status	of	the	Principle	is	moot,	a	point	that	unfortunately	has	also	sometimes	been	missed	in	subsequent	discussions	(French	and	Redhead	op.	cit.).	It	is	only	when	the	individuality	option	has	been	taken	that	the	question	arises	whether	the	Principle	can	be	sustained	in	the	context	of	modern	physics	and	unfortunately	the	answer	is	that	it	cannot,	if	we	adopt	the	‘standard’	form	of	both	quantum	mechanics	and	the	principle	itself	(French	and	Redhead	ibid.;	I	will	return	to	this	caveat	shortly).	This	result	then	blocks	the	reductive	move	of	seeking	the	ground	of	individuality	in	the	properties	of	the	object	and	leaves	the	alternative,	naturalistically	distasteful	options	of	having	to	appeal	to	haecceities,	or	something	like	Lockean	substance	or	some	other	metaphysical	device	in	order	to	make	metaphysical	sense	of	this	package.			 Let	us	pause	and	review:	quantum	statistics	supports	two,	metaphysically	quite	different,	packages	–	according	to	one,	quantum	particles	can	be	regarded	as	non-individual	objects	where	this	non-individuality	can	be	formally	understood	in	terms	of	quasi-set	theory;	according	to	the	other,	quantum	particles	can	still	be	regarded	as	individuals,	where	that	individuality	is	grounded	in	some	form	of	primitive	thisness	or	other	metaphysical	device	going	beyond	the	properties	of	the	particles.	Thus	we	have	a	form	of	‘metaphysical	underdetermination’,	according	to	which	the	physics	supports	two	different	fundamental	metaphysical	options.		
Van	Fraassen’s	Challenge	Should	we	be	bothered	by	this	underdetermination?	Van	Fraassen	thinks	so.	The	concluding	section	of	his	book,	setting	out	the	above	landscape	as	he	sees	it	(1991),	is	entitled	‘Goodbye	to	Metaphysics’,	by	which	he	really	means	‘Goodbye	to	Metaphysically	Informed	Realism’.	The	undermining	of	realism	can	be	unpacked	as	follows:	the	realist	affirms	a	belief	in	the	existence	of	electrons,	say.	Implicit	in	this	belief	is	the	view	of	electrons	as	objects	(elsewhere	I	have	referred	to	this	as	the	‘object-oriented	stance’;	French	2014).	That	view	only	makes	sense	if	the	electrons,	as	objects,	have	a	determinate	‘individuality	profile’																																																									5	These	may	be	distinguished	in	that	‘primitive’	individuality	is,	as	the	term	suggests,	ungrounded,	whereas	the	haecceity	view	grounds	it	in	this	further	metaphysical	concept	(see	Scarpati	2019;	again	I	am	grateful	to	Claudio	Calosi	for	highlighting	this	distinction).		
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(Brading	and	Skiles	2012).	However,	the	above	considerations	demonstrate	that	they	do	not	have	such	a	determinate	profile;	or	at	least,	not	one	that	is	naturalistically	grounded.			 How	might	the	realist	respond?	One	option	is	to	cut	the	argument	off	before	it	really	gets	going	by	insisting	that	belief	in	the	existence	of	electrons	does	not	involve	belief	in	them	as	objects,	or	indeed,	any	other	metaphysical	category	of	entity.	This	eschewal	of	a	metaphysical	informing	of	her	position	would	leave	the	realist	at	the	‘shallow’	end	of	the	metaphysical	range	(Magnus	2012)	and	indeed,	there	have	been	moves	recently	to	reconfigure	realism	in	almost	entirely	epistemic	terms	(Saatsi	2017a).	Thus	one	might	insist	that	all	we	should	say	is	that	electrons	are	whatever	science	says	they	are	–	particles,	fields,	end-points	of	strings	or	whatever	–	and	that	the	job	of	the	realist	is	just	to	situate	our	‘best’	(however	that	is	determined)	theories	within	an	appropriate	philosophical	framework	involving	relevant	notions	of	truth,	reference,	progress	and	so	on.		 However,	one	might	feel	that	there	is	more	to	the	job	than	this!	So,	one	might	follow	Chakravartty	in	demanding	that	the	realist	provide	a	‘clear	picture’	of	how	the	world	is	(Chakravartty	2007,	p.	26)	and,	further,	that	the	clarity	of	such	a	picture	will	be	dependent	on	the	extent	to	which	it	is	metaphysically	informed.	This	would	be	to	slide	down	the	spectrum	towards	‘deeper’	forms	of	realism	but	how	deep	one	goes	will,	again,	depend	on	how	much	metaphysics	one	feels	one	has	to	appeal	to	in	order	to	achieve	a	given	level	of	clarity	(see	French	2018).	So,	van	Fraasssen,	at	least,	would	presumably	insist	that	if	the	realist	is	going	to	present	a	picture	of	electrons,	say,	as	objects,	she	needs	to	make	that	picture	clear	by	specifying	whether	qua	objects	they	are	individuals	or	not.	But	that	she	cannot	do,	at	least	not	naturalistically	in	the	sense	of	appealing	to	the	relevant	physics.	Thus	the	underdetermination	impacts	any	realist	who	seeks	to	go	beyond	the	very	‘shallowest’	forms	of	the	position	towards	some	‘clear	picture’	informed	by	what	might	be	taken	to	be	the	basic	metaphysics	of	objecthood.6			 Such	considerations	also	help	blunt	the	effect	of	an	alternative	response	to	the	underdetermination,	which	is	to	throw	up	one’s	hands,	as	it	were,	and	declare	that	forms	of	metaphysical	underdetermination	are	ubiquitous,	so	the	realist	shouldn’t	worry	about	this	one	in	particular.			 Thus,	for	example,	consider	the	metaphysics	of	properties.	These	may	be	regarded	in	terms	of	universals	that	are	instantiated	in	particulars,	or	they	may	be	understood	as	particulars	themselves	–	as	tropes	say.	The	latter	view	also	trifurcates,	with	some	holding	that	tropes	are	abstract,	others	that	they	are	concrete	and	still	others	maintaining	that	they	are	both	abstract	and	concrete	(for	a	useful	overview	see	Maurin	2018)	Now	the	realist	believes	that	the	electron	‘has’	(again	in	some	metaphysical	sense)	properties	such	as	(rest)	mass,	charge	and	spin.	How	metaphysically	informed	should	her	realism	be	in	order	to	provide	a	clear	picture	of	such	properties?	Should	she	be	required	to	take	a	stance	in	the	debate	over	whether	tropes	are	abstract	or	concrete	or	both?	That	seems	excessive	and	unnecessary	in	order	to	present	a	clear	picture.	On	the																																																									6	Of	course,	one	might	cleave	to	a	notion	of	object	that	goes	beyond	this	‘basic	metaphysics’	but	if	such	a	notion	is	tied	to	a	particular	‘individuality	profile’	–	by	virtue	of	having	a	spatio-temporal	location,	say	–	it	will	be	subject	to	this	underdetermination.	Again	I	am	grateful	to	Claudio	Calosi	for	his	comments	here.	
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other	hand,	it	doesn’t	seem	so	extreme	to	press	the	realist	on	whether	she	takes	properties	to	be	tropes,	in	general,	or	universals.	Perhaps	some	will	insist	that	here	too	we	have	a	clear	enough	picture	without	such	metaphysical	detail.		 However,	it	can	be	argued	that	when	it	comes	to	electrons	as	objects,	we	surely	have	a	less	than	clear	picture	if	we	cannot	say	whether	they	should	be	regarded	as	individuals	or	non-individuals.	Here	we	seem	to	have	moved	back	up	the	spectrum	towards	the	shallow	end	and	if	we’re	not	to	end	up	holding	a	metaphysically	attenuated	form	of	realism,	we	should	be	able	to	say	something	on	this	issue.	Supporting	this	argument	is	the	point	that	the	provision	of	such	a	picture,	when	it	comes	to	objects	at	least,	will	involve	not	just	providing	an	appropriate	metaphysical	framework	but	also	a	logical	or	more	generally	formal	one.	And	in	this	case	the	latter	frameworks	are	entirely	different:	when	it	comes	to	electrons	regarded	as	individuals	we	can	avail	ourselves	of	standard	set	theory	and	classical	logic	(issues	related	to	quantum	mechanics	notwithstanding)	but	if	we	take	the	electrons	as	non-individuals	option,	we	should	shift	to	quasi-set	theory	and	Schrödinger	logic.	Certainly,	as	indicated	above,	prior	to	these	formal	developments,	that	option	could	only	be	articulated	in	terms	of	a	metaphorical	picture	but	now	a	degree	of	clarity	has	been	achieved.	The	problem	is,	of	course,	that	we	can’t	take	that	particular	clear	picture	to	be	how	the	world	is,	given	the	underdetermination.			 There	is	more	to	say	here	of	course,	not	least	because	this	idea	of	providing	a	‘clear	picture’	may	not	itself	be	clear.	How	does	informing	one’s	realism	with	metaphysics	provide	a	measure	of	clarity,	for	example?	One	possible	answer	is	to	suggest	that	it	does	so	by	relating	the	‘picture’	we	are	concerned	with,	in	quantum	physics	in	this	case,	to	what	might	be	called	more	‘everyday’	pictures.	So,	for	example,	by	regarding	electrons	as	objects	and	as	individuals	and	taking	that	individuality	as	grounded	in	something	like	primitive	thisness,	we	can	relate	that	picture	to	our	understanding	(such	as	it	is)	of	all	kinds	of	objects	as	individuals	more	generally	(Chakravartty	refers	to	the	‘umbrella’	like	nature	of	metaphysics	in	this	regard).	Of	course,	some	would	argue	that	it	is	through	such	attempts	to	metaphysically	relate	quantum	entities	to	their	‘everyday’	counterparts	that	we	have	been	led	astray	in	our	endeavours	and	that	a	properly	naturalistic	approach	to	modern	physics	should	eschew	such	attempts	entirely	(Ladyman	and	Ross	2007,	Ch.	1).	However,	this	is	a	hard	line	to	take	and	would	culminate	in	a	kind	of	‘bottom	up’	approach	to	metaphysics,	effectively	demanding	that	an	appropriate	metaphysical	framework	for	quantum	physics	be	constructed	ab	initio,	something	that	is	fraught	with	problems.	Instead	we	might	adopt	a	more	moderate	approach	and	treat	metaphysics	as	a	kind	of	toolbox	from	which	we	can	appropriate	various	devices	and	techniques	for	our	own	purposes	(French	and	McKenzie	2012,	2015;	see	also	Bryant	2017),	including	that	of	providing	a	clear	picture	as	Chakravartty	suggests.	Obviously	that	takes	us	away	from	a	‘purely’	naturalistic	position	but	as	just	mentioned,	that's	problematic	anyway	and	if	we	are	going	to	leaven	our	realism	with	some	metaphysics,	it	seems	appropriate	to	acknowledge	that	we	can	do	so	along	some	kind	of	spectrum.			 Of	course,	that	doesn’t	in	itself	help	us	with	the	above	metaphysical	underdetermination,	but	within	such	a	moderate	approach	an	alternative	set	of	responses	can	be	obtained	by	appealing	to	some	further	factor	to	‘break’	the	underdetermination.		
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	 So,	let	us	first	consider	what	devices	might	be	extracted	from	the	metaphysical	‘toolbox’	and	used	to	support	the	non-individuals	package.			
Breaking	the	Underdetermination1:	Particles-as-Non-Individuals	Apparently	independently	of	van	Fraassen’s	work	along	similar	lines,	or	indeed	of	the	above	context	regarding	individuality	in	physics	in	general7,	Dasgupta	(2009)	has	argued	for	a	‘revisionary	metaphysics’	that	he	calls	‘generalism’,	that	eschews	‘individualistic’	facts	in	favour	of	those	that	are	only	qualitative	(for	a	comparison	of	generalism	with	ontic	structural	realism,	see	Glick	2018;	French	forthcoming)8.	His	argument	is	based	on	the	claim	that	what	he	calls	‘primitive	individuals’	are	both	empirically	undetectable	and	physically	redundant	and	hence	can	be	dismissed	as	metaphysical	‘danglers’	or	‘idlers’	(Turner	2014).	The	argument	turns	on	a	central	analogy	that	is	drawn	with	absolute	velocity	in	classical	mechanics	(Dasgupta	op.	cit.,	p.	37).	Since	according	to	the	laws	of	Newtonian	mechanics	no	measuring	device	could	be	constructed	that	would	detect	absolute	velocity,	he	concludes	that	it	is	empirically	undetectable.	Furthermore,	differences	in	absolute	velocity	at	one	time	do	not	give	rise	to	any	other	differences	at	later	times	and	hence	he	maintains,	it	is	physically	redundant	as	well.			 By	analogy	Dasgupta	concludes	that	primitive	individuals	are	also	danglers,	since,	again	according	to	the	laws	of	Newtonian	mechanics,	two	particles	with	the	same	mass,	charge	and	so	on,	launched	from	the	same	spot	with	the	same	initial	velocity	and	subject	to	the	same	forces	will	follow	the	same	trajectory.	Hence,	differences	in	individualistic	facts	at	a	certain	time	do	not	give	rise	to	any	differences	at	later	times	and	this	is	because	the	laws	of	Newtonian	mechanics	do	not	pertain	to	the	individuality	per	se	of	the	particles	but	only	the	relevant	properties.	Not	only	is	the	particles’	individuality	physically	redundant,	it	is	also	empirically	undetectable,	since	if,	unbeknownst	to	us,	a	certain	individual	were	permuted	with	another	with	exactly	the	same	properties	we	could	not	tell	the	difference.	Furthermore	given	the	laws	of	physics	it	is	impossible	to	build	any	device	that	could	distinguish	between	these	two	situations,	precisely	because	primitive	individuals	are	physically	redundant	(ibid.,	pp.	42-43).	Hence	‘primitive	individuality’	should	be	eliminated.		 My	point	in	presenting	Dasgupta’s	proposal	here	is	to	illustrate	how	a	particular	metaphysical	device	taken	from	the	‘toolbox’	may	help	render	a	certain	naturalistically	inclined	package	more	acceptable:	in	this	case	we	can	appreciate	how	the	above	conclusions	mesh	nicely	with	the	view	of	quantum	particles	as	non-individuals.	But	of	course,	there	are	differences	and	also	concerns	that	may	be	raised.		 The	most	obvious	difference	is	that	the	non-individuals	package	has	been	articulated	in	terms	of	quasi-set	theory,	whereas	Dasgupta	deploys	an	algebraic	framework	in	which	certain	functors	express	the	relevant	features	of	the	domain	of	properties	without	individuals:	some	express	the	conjunction	and	negation	of	properties,	others	express	the	permutation	of	properties,	another	captures	the																																																									7	Turner	(2014)	in	his	response	to	Dasgupta	does	at	least	point	to	this	context	but	associates	it	with	‘quantum	probabilities’	without	going	into	detail.	8	Glick	concludes	that	generalism	does	not	provide	an	appropriate	metaphysical	framework	for	ontic	structural	realism	because	it	cannot	accommodate	the	motivations	for	the	latter.		
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idea	of	partially	‘filling’	a	property	as	in	instantiating	its	first	position	and	so	on.9	This	affords	a	framework	for	his	generalist	metaphysics	in	which	the	fundamental	facts	of	the	world	have	the	form	P0	obtains,	where	P0	is	a	0-place	property	that	may	be	formed	from	more	basic	terms	through	the	application	of	the	above	functors	(2009,	p.	53).	Within	this	framework,	statements	that	apparently	refer	to	individuals,	such	as	those	we	typically	make	about	entities	in	the	‘everyday’	world	can	be	accommodated	through	a	form	of	error	theory,	according	to	which	such	statements	are	strictly	false,	or	fictionalism,	according	to	which	they	are	true	of	the	fiction	that	there	are	individuals,	or	reductionism,	according	to	which	they	actually	refer	to	more	fundamental	facts,	such	as	those	expressed	in	the	generalist	picture,	and	so	on	(ibid.,	p.	54).	Of	course,	these	might	be	seen	as	costs	involved	in	using	such	a	framework	but	Dasgupta	insists	that	the	ontological	parsimony	that	results	from	eliminating	primitive	individuals	more	than	compensates	for	such	costs	(ibid.,	p.	57).10			 There	are	also	obvious	concerns	having	to	do	with	Dasgupta’s	core	argument	and	hence	with	its	extension	to	the	non-individuals	case.11	One	might	worry,	for	example,	that	the	analogy	with	absolute	velocity	has	led	him	astray.	In	this	case,	of	course	we’re	talking	about	a	property	not	a	primitive	individual	and	as	such	it	was	only	removed	from	physical	theory	after	a	great	deal	of	theoretical	and	empirical	effort,	culminating	in	Einstein’s	theory	of	Special	Relativity.	You	might	think	that	individuality	was	likewise	removed	after	considerable	effort	culminating	in	quantum	mechanics	but	as	we	have	seen,	that's	not	quite	the	case	–	unlike	absolute	velocity	and	Special	Relativity,	individuality	is	compatible	with	quantum	physics.12		Furthermore,	by	focusing	only	on	Newtonian	mechanics,	Dasgupta	fails	to	take	note	of	classical	statistical	mechanics,	where,	as	noted	above,	individuality	was	assumed	right	from	the	start.	In	this	case,	Dasgupta’s	permutation	argument	does	not	go	through:	even	though	the	objects	concerned	–	gas	atoms	–	are	indiscernible	such	that	we	could	not	tell	the	difference,	the	permutation	makes	a	difference	insofar	as	it	underpins	the	counting	that	lies	at	the	heart	of	Maxwell-Boltzmann	statistics.	Dasgupta’s	argument	is	too	quick	in	this	respect.		 Having	said	that,	he	could	appeal	to	Saunders’	argument	that	the	so-called	Gibbs	Paradox	involving	the	mixing	of	gases	shows	that	individuality	should	be	abandoned	even	in	the	context	of	classical	statistical	mechanics	(Saunders	2006a).13	Saunders’	conclusion	could	then	be	recast	in	terms	of	Dasgupta’s	claim																																																									9	Berto’s,	Bueno’s	and	Jantzen’s	general	concerns	might	equally	apply	to	this	framework,	of	course.		10	There	are	further	costs	associated	with	the	algebraic	language	that	Dasgupta	proposes	(Turner	2014).		11	Thus	Glick	(2018)	argues	that	‘it’s	hard	to	see	how	the	generalist	can	adopt	the	received	view	that	takes	only	quantum	particles	to	be	‘non-individuals’’	because		the	latter	relies	on	‘distinctive	features	of	indistinguishable	quantum	particles	that	are	independent	of	the	status	of	primitive	individuals	in	general.	’	(p.	15).	12	Also,	the	redundancy	of	absolute	velocity	follows	from	the	fact	that	Newton’s	Second	Law	involves	second	order	derivatives	whereas	the	argument	from	quantum	statistics	relies	on	no	such	features.	One	might	be	concerned	that	the	former	is	less	prone	to	interpretational	worries	than	the	latter	but	permutation	symmetry	holds	whatever	interpretation	of	quantum	mechanics	is	chosen.	Again,	thanks	to	Claudio	Calosi	for	encouraging	me	emphasise	this	point.	13	Interestingly,	Saunders	also	advocates	a	form	of	generalism;	see	Saunders,	“The	world	is	the	totality	of	quantities,	not	of	things”,	Presidential	Address	at	the	2018	Meeting	of	the	British	Society	for	the	Philosophy	of	Science.	
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that	individuality	is	a	‘dangler’	even	in	classical	mechanics.	Still,	that's	not	conclusive.	One	could,	for	example,	take	the	paradox	to	be	a	kind	of	‘footprint’	(in	Post’s	sense;	Post	1971),	or	retrospective	intrusion	within	classical	statistical	mechanics	of	the	forthcoming	‘new’	quantum	statistics	(French	and	Krause	2006,	pp.	83-84).	Here	we	bump	up	against	issues	of	theory	identity	and	specifically,	where	classical	mechanics	ends	and	quantum	theory	begins.	Nevertheless,	the	point	remains:	there	is	a	broader	metaphysical	framework	available	in	terms	of	which	we	can	make	further	sense	of	the	non-individuals	package.		 However,	one	can	also	take	metaphysical	devices,	moves	and	arguments	out	of	the	toolbox	and	deploy	them	against	this	package.	Bueno,	for	example,	(Bueno	2014)	has	argued	that	the	notion	of	identity	is	fundamental	and	that	it	should	not	be	given	up	without	further	reflection.	In	the	case	of	the	non-individuality	package,	in	particular,	he	argues	that	concerns	arise	with	regard	to	quantification.	Certainly,	without	identity	one	cannot	assign	an	ordinal	to	a	collection	of	quantum	particles	but	perhaps	one	can	still	say	the	collection	has	a	kind	of	cardinality,	in	the	sense	that	although	one	cannot	specify	them	one	by	one	as	it	were,	one	can	still	claim	there	are	a	certain	number	in	the	collection.	However,	one	can	ask	how	this	cardinality	might	be	measured.	One	suggestion	(Domenech	and	Holik	2007)	is	to	take	such	a	collection,	in	the	form	of	a	helium	atom	say,	and	repeatedly	ionize	it.	Counting	the	electron	tracks	produced	then	allows	us	to	measure	the	cardinality	of	the	collection	of	elections	in	the	atom.14	Unfortunately,	Bueno	argues,	this	assumes	the	identity	of	the	electrons,	lest	we	lose	all	possibility	of	taking	the	tracks	to	be	those	of	distinct	electrons	to	begin	with.	Hence	identity	cannot	be	dispensed	with.15		 This	is	an	example	of	quite	a	general	manoeuvre	that	may	be	(rather	bluntly!)	summarized	as	follows:	take	a	metaphysical	claim	made	in	the	context	of	quantum	physics	and	raise	concerns	about	it	using	an	example	explicated	in	a	(broadly)	classical	context	(a	similar	concern	to	Bueno’s	was	raised	by	Chakravartty	2003).	So,	in	the	example	above,	once	we	have	ionized	the	helium	atom	and	are	counting	electron	tracks	we	are	no	longer	in	the	quantum	‘domain’	and	by	virtue	of	being	allocated	trajectories	in	space-time,	the	electrons	can	be	taken	to	possess	a	form	of	‘spatio-temporal	individuality’	(French	and	Krause	2006,	pp.	66-82).	But	of	course,	recalling	the	famous	admonitions	of	Heisenberg	et.	al.,	we	cannot	uncontentiously	take	the	electrons	to	be	actually	following	such	trajectories	(unless	we	have	already	adopted	the	Bohm	interpretation	of																																																									14	This	of	course	is	grossly	simplified	as	stated;	nevertheless,	cardinality	measurements	are	by	necessity	indirect:	one	might	attribute	n	protons	to	a	given	nucleus	(and	hence	n	electrons	to	the	atom),	for	example,	by	measuring	the	mass	of	the	nucleus	using	a	Penning	trap,	say	(see	http://aruna.physics.fsu.edu/ebss_lectures/F_Lecture3.pdf)	and	then	knowing	the	mass	of	the	proton	and	the	effect	of	the	strong	nuclear	force,	infer	the	number	of	protons.		15	Following	Aristotle	(and	also	as	diverse	a	couple	of	philosophers	as	Auyang	and	Heidegger),	Berto	argues	that		‘identity	amounts	to	unity’	and	shares	the	primitive	nature	of	the	latter	(Berto	2017,	p.	78).	Permutation	symmetry	is	then	to	be	understood	as	an	epistemological	condition,	with	no	metaphysical	implications	and	indiscernible	quantum	objects	understood	as	referred	to	only	arbitrarily.	All	of	this	is	simply	to	acknowledge	the	various	aspects	of	the	alternative	metaphysical	‘package’	that	takes	such	objects	to	be	individuals,	as	discussed	below.	Berto	insists	that	taking	identity	as	primitive	because	it	is	one	with	‘being	one’	does	not	pre-judge	the	sort	of	comparison	between	such	packages	as	I	am	engaged	in	here	(ibid.,	p.	80).		However,	despite	this	insistence,	it	is	hard	to	see	how	its	identification	of	the	concept	with	‘unity’	does	not	beg	the	question	against	the	non-individuals	account.	Thanks	to	Claudio	Calosi	for	pointing	me	to	Berto’s	paper.	
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quantum	mechanics)	and	so	this	must	be	regarded	as	a	form	of	‘mock’	individuality,	to	use	Toraldo	di	Francia’s	felicitous	phrase	(French	and	Krause	2006	pp.	230-231).	To	use	this	as	the	basis	for	attributing,	within	the	quantum	context,	identity	to	the	electrons	is	then	illegitimate	(Arenhart	2017).16			 Of	course,	one	might	dispute	the	presumed	distinction	between	quantum	and	classical	‘domains’,	insisting	perhaps	that	the	world	is	quantum	in	its	entirety,	as	it	were.	However,	the	clue	to	a	response	lies	in	the	term	‘mock’	individuality	–	it	is	not	being	claimed	that	the	electrons	are	individuals	with	identity	in	one	‘domain’	that	is	somehow	lost	in	another;	rather	the	idea	is	that	there	is	only	the	appearance	of	individuality	in	the	measurement	context	(both	Born	and	Schrödinger	were	concerned	about	accounting	for	this	appearance	and	attempted	to	account	for	it	by	drawing	on	Gestalt	psychology;	see	French	and	Krause	2006	p.	120).	What	one	should	not	do	is	take	that	appearance,	base	a	certain	metaphysics	upon	it	(in	this	case,	a	metaphysics	of	identity	as	standardly	understood)	and	then	attempt	to	export	that	metaphysics	beyond	that	specific	measurement	context	in	an	attempt	to	apply	it	to	the	particles	generally	(for	a	more	detailed	response	to	Bueno’s	concern,	see	Arenhart	and	Krause	2019).		 Granted	the	above,	and	the	general	principle	of	not	begging	the	question	against	the	non-individuals	package	by	assuming,	implicitly	or	otherwise,	that	for	something	to	be	an	object	it	must	be	an	individual	object,	one	can	also	deploy	certain	devices	from	the	metaphysical	toolbox	to	support	the	particles-as-individuals	alternative.			
Breaking	the	Underdetermination2:	Particles-as-Individuals	We	recall	that	this	package	seems	to	require	metaphysical	grounding	via	some	account	of	individuality.	Of	course,	one	could	simply	deny	this	requirement	and	take	individuality	to	be	primitive	(see,	for	example,	Morganti	2009).	This,	it	has	been	claimed,			‘…allows	for	a	great	methodological	gain	in	terms	of	simplicity,	clarity	and	conservativeness	with	respect	to	entrenched	metaphysical	beliefs	and	schemes,	while	being	at	least	equally	satisfactory	in	terms	of	defining	an	ontological	interpretation	that	meets	the	criteria	and	constraints	set	by	a	naturalistic	methodology.’	Dorato	and	Morganti	2013,	pp.	605-606).			One	might	immediately	balk	at	the	assertion	that	accepting	individuality	into	our	metaphysical	pantheon	as	a	primitive	offers	any	gain	in	simplicity.	Of	course,	the	demand	for	reducing	the	number	of	such	primitives	in	any	system	is	a	staple	of	metaphysicians’	debates.	However,	evaluations	of	simplicity	are	notoriously	problematic,	even	in	science	(from	where	such	evaluative	criteria	are	typically	imported	and	of	course	further	questions	then	arise	as	to	the	appropriateness	of																																																									16	Similarly,	Jantzen	argues	for	the	strong	claim	that	‘…	identity	and	cardinality	are	tied	together	as	a	matter	of	meaning	irrespective	of	metaphysics’	(Jantzen	2019,	p.	288).	Consequently,	he	maintains,	talk	of	entities	without	identity	is	either	meaningless	or,	in	fact,	talk	about	something	else	altogether	(he	suggests	mass	terms).	Perhaps	the	only	response	to	such	blunt	claims	as	those	made	by	Berto	and	Jantzen	is	to	insist	that	quasi-cardinality	is	the	appropriate	formal	counterpart	to	‘countability’	when	it	comes	to	quantum	entities,	for	which	the	‘conceptual	link’	between	cardinality	and	identity	must	be	taken	as	broken.			
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their	use	in	a	different	domain;	see	Saatsi	2017b)	and	one	may	pay	for	such	simplicity	via	reduction	in	terms	of	further	complexity	elsewhere	(this	is	a	core	issue	in	the	debate	between	Dasgupta	and	Turner	for	example	and	is	adduced	by	Dorato	and	Morganti	as	a	further	reason	for	preferring	their	approach	(op.	cit.)).			 One	can	engage	in	a	similar	‘to	and	fro’	when	it	comes	to	the	gain	in	‘clarity	and	conservativeness’	afforded	by	primitive	individuality	but	I	shall	set	that	to	one	side.	More	crucially	for	the	current	discussion	is	the	assertion	that	acceptance	of	this	notion	does	not	necessarily	conflict	with	a	naturalistic	stance	in	general.	The	basis	for	this	is	the	claim	that	the	formal	language	of	quantum	theory	manifests	a	certain	notion	of	‘countability’	in	the	sense	that	the	theory	assumes	that	we	are	dealing	with	a	system	of	n	entities	to	begin	with	and,	further,	this	notion	can	be	regarded	as	metaphysically	and	physically	significant	in	itself	(Dorato	and	Morganti	2013,	p.	606).	The	manifestation	of	n	entities	is	thus	taken	to	have	an	ontological	counterpart	such	that	we	can	consider	them	to	be	n	individuals,	independently	of	any	consideration	of	any	other	factor	(such	as	those	to	be	considered	below).	Thus,	‘Primitivism	…	provides	us	with	the	most	straightforward	and	uncomplicated	ontological	interpretation	of	the	theory.’	(ibid.).			 Now,	this	should	not	be	taken	to	suggest	that	it	is	‘countability’	that	is	serving	as	the	ground	for	the	attribution	of	individuality,	in	which	case	one	might	wonder	in	what	sense	the	latter	can	be	understood	as	primitive.17	Rather,	the	idea	seems	to	be	that	the	formal	language	of	the	theory	yields	a	determinate	number	of	entities;	hence	the	corresponding	items	within	the	theory	–	labels	or	whatever	–		are	countable;	this	formal	countability	has	an	ontological	counterpart	and	on	the	basis	of	that	we	can	take	the	entities	to	be	individuals,	where	this	individuality	is	not	be	understood	as	reducible	to	anything	else.	A	more	serious	concern	has	to	do	with	some	ambiguity	in	what	we	are	supposed	to	take	as	the	‘formal	language’	of	the	theory.	Thus	it	is	stated	(ibid.,	p.	606,	fn	14)	that	a	similar	idea	is	expressed	in	(Ladyman	and	Bigaj	2010)	where	it	is	assumed	that	anything	that	is	the	value	of	a	first	order	variable	can	be	taken	to	be	an	individual.	The	same	Quinean	line	(see	Dorato	and	Morganti	op	cit.,	p.	593	fn1)	is	taken	by	Saunders	in	his	approach,	to	be	considered	below,	but	has	been	criticized	for	begging	the	question	against	the	non-individuals	package	that,	as	we’ve	seen,	adopts	a	different	formal	framework.	Elsewhere	(Dorato	and	Morganti	op.	cit.,	p.	607)	it	is	left	unspecified	whether	we	are	supposed	to	consider	such	a	formal	reconstruction	of	‘the’	theory	(whatever	that	is	taken	to	be)	or	rather	the	language	of	the	theory	as	it	appears	‘au	naturel’	as	it	were,	in	papers,	presentations,	textbooks	and	so	forth.18	In	the	latter	case	it	is	not	at	all	clear,	at	the	very	least,	whether	there	is	always	the	above	manifestation	of	countability	(as	an	example	of	the	difference	between	the	Quinean	and	‘au	naturel’	presentations	of	a	theory,	take	a	look	at	Landau	and	Lifshitz	1977).	But	even	in	cases	where	it	is,	the	advocate	of	the	non-individuals	package	could	always	insist	that	there	is	also	a	notion	of	‘countability’	expressed	within	their	framework,	only	now	it	is	captured	formally	via	‘quasi-cardinality’	rather	than	the	usual	cardinality	plus	ordinality	combination	(and	here	we	might	recall	what																																																									17	Again	we	recall	Berto’s	claim:	if	individuality	is	‘one	with	being	one’	then	if	the	latter	is	primitive,	the	former	has	to	be	as	well,	given	their	identification.		18	I	am	sceptical	as	to	whether	one	can	even	assert	that	there	is	a	theory	that	is	subject	to	different	reconstructions	or	presentations	(French	2020).		
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we’ve	said	above).	Thus	having	a	notion	of	countability	on	hand	does	not	necessarily	provide	the	basis	for	claiming	that	the	entities	concerned	are	individuals,	understood	in	primitive	terms	or	not.			 Having	said	all	that,	appealing	to	the	device	of	primitive	individuality	does	not	undermine	my	overall	project	here.	On	the	contrary,	given	the	non-naturalistic	flavour	of	haecceity,	as	one	option,	allowing	primitive	individuality	as	a	naturalistically	more	acceptable	metaphysical	alternative	could	be	seen	as	further	enhancing	the	particles-as-individuals	package	and	thereby	strengthening	the	metaphysical	underdetermination.	Nevertheless,	whether	for	reasons	of	simplicity	or	clarity	or	even	better	naturalistic	fit	in	general	(despite	what	is	argued	in	Dorato	and	Morganti	op.	cit.)	one	might	prefer	to	ground	individuality	in	the	relevant	properties	that	are	represented	within	the	theory,	whether	formally	reconstructed	or	not.	However,	as	noted	above,	that	requires	the	Principle	of	Identity	of	Indiscernibles	which	has	been	ruled	out	in	the	quantum	context.	Fortunately,	Saunders	has	revived	a	form	of	the	Principle	by	himself	delving	into	a	kind	of	‘toolbox’	–	Quine’s	–	and	retrieving	a	notion	of	‘weak	discernibility’	that	can	be	deployed	in	the	case	of	quantum	theory	(Saunders	2006b).	 	 The	core	idea	is	that	two	individuals	can	be	said	to	be	weakly	discernible	if	they	enter	into	irreflexive	relations	of	the	form	‘…	has	different	P	from	…’,	where	P	is	some	predicate.	Since	two	fermions	in	a	singlet	state,	say,	must	possess	different	spins	(one	will	have	spin	‘up’,	the	other	spin	‘down’)	they	can	be	said	to	enter	into	such	a	relation	and	hence	are	weakly	discernible	and	can	be	regarded	as	individuals	in	this	sense.	We	can	understand	this	approach	as	offering	a	further	means	of	articulating	the	quantum	particles-as-individuals	package	but	insofar	as	the	individuality	is	grounded	not	in	some	metaphysical	notion	of	primitive	thisness	or	whatever	but	in	certain	relations	holding	between	the	particles	in	a	certain	state,	it	might	be	seen	as	more	naturalistically	acceptable	than	the	alternatives.	Furthermore,	not	only	does	this	provide	another	nice	example	of	the	deployment	of	a	metaphysical	device,	it	also	illustrates	how	such	a	device,	having	been	initially	discarded,	may	see	its	fortunes	restored,	as	it	were	–	Leibniz’s	Principle	was	rejected	as	false	in	quantum	mechanics,	only	for	Saunders	to	re-tool	it	using	this	Quinean	notion	of	‘weak	discernibility’	(for	further	discussion	of	such	moves,	see	French	and	Mckenzie	2015).		 Needless	to	say,	however,	matters	are	still	not	entirely	straightforward.	As	the	above	brief	sketch	indicates,	weak	discernibility	as	originally	presented	only	applies	to	fermions	that	can	exist	in	such	singlet	states.	Bosons,	on	the	other	hand,	do	not	enter	into	such	irreflexive	relations.	One	possible	option	is	to	draw	a	distinction	between	fermions	and	bosons	that	accommodates	this	difference	in	discernibility.	Thus	Saunders	has	suggested	that	whereas	the	former	are	‘material’	particles,	the	latter	are	force	‘carriers’	and	hence,	as	mere	field	excitations,	might	not	be	expected	to	be	discernible.	The	obvious	worry	is	that	this	seems	to	be	a	bit	of	an	ad	hoc	move.	Subsequently,	Saunders’	original	argument	was	generalized,	to	conclude	that	fermions	are	always	weakly	discernible	and	bosons	sometimes	are,	depending	on	the	state	they	happen	to	be	in	(Muller	and	Saunders	2008).		However	this	generalization	has	itself	been	criticized	on	the	grounds	that	the	operators	appealed	to	in	the	bosonic	case	are	unphysical,	and	those	in	the	case	of	fermions	are	multiples	of	the	identity,	hence	
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do	not	correspond	to	any	physical	relation	(Huggett	and	Norton	2014).	Fortunately,	again,	physically	appropriate	sets	of	observables	can	be	constructed	in	terms	of	which	it	can	be	shown	that	both	bosons	and	fermions	can	be	categorically	weakly	discerned	in	certain	states	and	probabilistically	so	in	all	(where	the	former	pertains	to	being	in	an	eigenstate	of	the	relevant	observable	and	the	latter	to	possession	of	a	given	expectation	value	of	an	observable;	ibid.).			 Nevertheless,	one	might	still	have	concerns	about	the	use	of	this	particular	tool	of	‘weak	discernibility’.	Let	us	go	back	to	the	core	idea,	exemplified	in	the	case	of	fermions	by	the	irreflexive	relation	‘…	has	different	spin	from	…’	conferring	weak	discernibility	upon	them.	A	well-known	worry	about	the	use	of	relations	to	ground	individuality	is	that	insofar	as	a	relation	is	taken	to	hold	between	two	relata,	this	move	presupposes	the	identity	of	the	latter.	The	issue	here	is	one	of	ontological	priority.	One	response	is	to	shift	that	priority	to	the	relations,	so	that	instead	of	talking	of	relations	holding	‘between’	two	relata,	already	ontologically	‘in	place’,	as	it	were,	one	conceives	of	the	latter	as	being	constituted,	in	some	sense,	out	of	the	former.	Of	course,	effecting	such	a	shift	is	precisely	what	has	been	taken	to	characterize	structuralism	in	general	(for	further	discussion,	see	French	and	Krause	2006,	pp.	175-177).	And	of	course	it	involves	the	(partial)	abandonment	of	the	object	oriented	stance,	which	is	precisely	the	response	to	the	underdetermination	to	be	discussed	below.	Whether	one	sees	this	as	a	further	cost	or	a	positive	feature	of	the	‘weak	discernibility’	approach	obviously	depends	on	one’s	sympathies	towards	the	structuralist	tendency.			 There	is,	however,	an	even	deeper	issue	here	that	has	to	do	with	the	justification	for	attributing	properties	to	quantum	systems	in	general.		Standardly,	this	attribution	is	provided	by	the	so-called	‘Eigenvalue-Eigenstate	Link’	which,	simply	put,	states	that	a	given	property	can	only	be	attributed	to	a	system	if	and	only	if	that	system	is	in	the	corresponding	eigenstate	of	the	observable	concerned.	Typically	this	is	used	to	attribute	monadic	properties,	such	as	spin,	to	systems	but	as	Muller	and	Saunders	note,	a	crucial	step	in	their	argument	for	the	claim	that	fermions	are	weakly	discernible	is	to	extend	the	Eigenvalue-Eigenstate	Link	to	relations	(Muller	and	Saunders	2008,	p.	515).	Norton,	however,	has	raised	concerns	about	this	step;	in	particular,	with	regard	to	the	attribution	of	the	irreflexive	relation	‘has	opposite	spin	to’	to	the	specific	formal	expression	used	in	Muller	and	Saunders’	argument	(Norton	2015).	He	asks	three	questions:	why	should	we	take	this	formal	expression	to	represent	any	physical	property	of	the	system	at	all?	If	we	do	so	take	it,	why	should	we	take	it	to	represent	a	dyadic	property	and	not	some	property	of	different	arity?	And	even	if	we	accept	that,	why	should	we	take	it	to	represent	a	symmetric	and	irreflexive	dyadic	property?		 As	he	goes	on	to	note,	what	needs	to	be	provided	here	is	an	extension	of	the	Eigenvalue-Eigenstate	Link	that	would	enable	us	to	move	from	the	particular	formal	expression	to	the	relevant	n-adic	property	(ibid.,	p.	1194).	Unfortunately,	Muller	and	Saunders	do	not	provide	such	an	extension,	nor	is	one	part	of	the	standard	formulation	of	quantum	mechanics.	Furthermore,	even	if	we	were	to	accept	that	such	a	move	could	be	made,	some	further	justification	would	need	to	be	given	to	interpret	that	property	as	‘has	opposite	spin	to’.	Here	things	are	unclear,	to	say	the	least,	since	the	relevant	formalism	as	it	stands	does	not	rule	out	other	interpretations	of	that	formal	expression	(ibid.,	pp.	1195-1196).	
	 15	
Interestingly,	part	of	the	justification	for	the	interpretation	in	terms	of	‘opposite	spin	to’	refers	back	to	an	earlier	argument	of	Saunders	(2003)	but	as	Norton	notes	(2015	p.	1196	fn	9)	this	in	turn	draws	on	Mermin’s	‘relationalist’	interpretation	of	quantum	mechanics	that	eschews	relata	to	begin	with	(as	noted	in	French	and	Krause	2006,	p.	175)	and	so,	in	that	case,	there	would	be	no	objects	to	be	weakly	discernible	and	the	status	of	PII	would,	again,	be	obviated!		 More	significantly,	perhaps,	Norton	claims	that	what	does	the	‘heavy	lifting’	in	the	identification	of	the	relevant	property	as	‘has	opposite	spin	to’	is	simply	the	assertion	that	each	of	the	two	particles	in	the	relevant	state	happen	to	have	opposite	values	of	spin	(ibid.,	p.	1196).	However,	as	he	goes	on	to	argue,	a	possible	circularity	arises	here	and	to	avoid	it,	we	need	to	verify	that	assertion.	Unfortunately,	given	that	the	particles	are	in	an	entangled	state,	neither	one	can	be	isolated	in	order	to	determine	its	spin.	And	granted	that	the	relevant	observable	does	pick	out	opposite	eigenvalues	in	the	case	of	the	singlet	state,	one	still	has	to	provide	grounds	for	identifying	a	given	part	of	the	relevant	expression	as	representing	which	particle.	Here	it	is	easy	to	be	misled	by	the	way	we	write	the	relevant	expression:		
ψ	=	1/√2(↑↓ -	↓↑)		Tempted	as	we	might	be	to	read	↑↓	as	‘particle	one	with	spin	up	and	particle	two	with	spin	down’,	treating	the	terms	in	this	way	as	separately	giving	information	about	the	state	is	akin	the	regarding	the	above	expression	as	describing	a	statistical	mixture,	rather	than	an	entangled	state	(ibid.,	p.	1197).	It	is	the	state	as	a	whole	that	has	physical	content,	not	what	appear	in	the	formalism	as	separate	components.	Thus,	the	above	piece	of	formalism	‘…may	tempt	us	into	thinking	that	its	pattern	of	arrows	is	revealing	hidden	relations	between	the	single	particles.’	(ibid.,	p.	1198).	However,	absent	further	justification,	such	temptations	should	be	resisted	and	hence,	Norton	concludes,	‘…there	is	nothing	in	the	singlet	state’s	description	that	warrants	attributing	opposite	spin	to	its	particles.’	(ibid.;	see	also	Calosi	and	Morganti	forthcoming)		 In	fact,	a	similar	concern	has	been	raised	previously,	both	in	the	context	of	an	early	consideration	of	Saunders’	argument	(French	and	Krause	2006,	pp.	174-177)	and	with	regard	to	the	debate	over	the	status	of	the	‘standard’	form	of	the	Principle	of	Identity	of	Indiscernibles;	that	is,	without	weak	discernibility	(Massimi	2001;	see	also	French	and	Krause	2006,	pp.	166-168).	It	hinges	on	the	question,	why	should	we	take	the	relevant	expression	–	such	as	the	example	above	–	whether	presented	in	a	formal	reconstruction	of	the	theory	or	in	the	form	of	the	latter	as	given	in	textbooks	and	the	like,	as	representing	two	objects	in	the	relevant	state	to	begin	with	(cf.	Norton	2015,	p.	1198)?			 Of	course	it	is	not	enough	to	say,	well	that	is	simply	how	the	expression	is	written;	that	is,	in	such	a	way	that	it	invites	interpretation	in	terms	of	two	objects	being	in	the	relevant	state.	As	Norton	has	rehearsed	and	as	sketched	above,	such	an	interpretation	is	not	straightforward	even	if	the	theory	is	taken	‘au	naturel’.	And	of	course,	more	generally,	when	we	write	down	the	appropriate	expression	for	a	collective	of	particles,	we	might	begin	by	assigning	‘particle	1’	say	to	‘state	1’,	‘particle	2’	to	‘state	2’	and	so	on	but	then,	following	Schrödinger’s	prescription,	we	apply	the	particle	permutation	operator	to	obtain	all	possible	permuted	combinations	and	then	select	out	of	those	the	symmetric	and	anti-
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symmetric	forms	(leaving	to	one	side	those	corresponding	to	parastatistics,	of	course).	In	effect	we	begin	by	assuming	the	particles	are	objects	that	can	be	labeled	and	hence	putatively	attributed	with	individuality	but	then	we	permute	these	labels	in	such	a	way	that	we	cannot	‘tell’	which	particle	is	which	so	that	the	individuality	is	either	‘lost’	or,	at	best,	‘masked’	(Post	1963).	But	what	is	the	basis	for	this	assumption	to	begin	with?		We	could	appeal,	again,	to	the	observation	of	particle	‘traces’	in	various	experimental	contexts	but	at	best	that	allows	us	to	attribute	Toraldo	di	Francia’s	‘mock’	individuality	and	as	already	noted,	we	cannot	presume	that	this	can	straightforwardly	be	exported	out	of	those	contexts	(again	see	French	and	Krause	2006,	p.	166).		 Alternatively,	we	can	acknowledge,	with	Norton,	that	weak	discernibility	cannot	be	attributed	to	the	particles	and	thus	that	there	is	simply	no	basis	for	contemplating	the	status	of	even	this	modified	form	of	Leibniz’s	Principle	in	the	quantum	domain.	Of	course,	that	still	doesn’t	necessarily	rule	out	the	particles-as-individuals	package	–	one	could	ground	their	individuality	in	haecceities	and	metaphysically	accommodate	the	entanglement	in	terms	of	some	other	device,	such	as	relations	of	‘non-supervenient’	relations	(Teller	1986;	see	also	French	1989b)	or	‘symmetric	dependence’	(Calosi	and	Morganti	forthcoming).19	As	noted	already,	the	extent	to	which	one	sees	such	options	as	running	counter	to	an	appropriate	form	of	naturalism	depends	on	one’s	attitude	towards	the	use	of	such	metaphysical	devices. 	 Let	us	pause	and	review.		As	we	have	seen,	both	‘packages’	can	be	elaborated	in	terms	of	a	variety	of	formal	and	metaphysical	‘devices’.	One	could	of	course	argue	that	the	deployment	of	somesuch	device	or	other	confers	a	significant	advantage	of	one	package	over	the	other	and	thereby	‘breaks’	the	underdetermination.	However,	as	we’ve	also	seen,	whatever	device	one	picks,	its	deployment	is	going	to	be	subject	to	an	array	of	caveats	and	counter-arguments	of	not	only	different	strength	–	insofar	as	that	can	be	measured	–	but	of	very	different	kinds,	with	the	result	that	comparing	them	is	not	just	a	matter	of	‘apples	vs.	oranges’	but	of	a	whole	basket	of	tropical	fruit!	So,	for	example,	for	all	that	the	notion	of	‘weak	discernibility’	can	be	subjected	to	the	above	criticisms,	it	at	least	has	the	virtue	of	being	presented	within	a	Quinean	and	hence	classical	logical	and	set-theoretical	framework;	whereas	if	you	feel	that	those	criticisms,	together	with	the	unalloyed	metaphysical	nature	of	haecceities,	compel	you	to	adopt	the	non-individuals	alternative,	you	have	to	accept	the	costs	associated	with	quasi-set	theory.	And	of	course,	none	of	these	metaphysical	moves	and	manoeuvres	will	impress	van	Fraassen	in	the	slightest!		
Back	to	the	Challenge	Returning	to	his	challenge,	then,	we	can	now	better	appreciate,	perhaps,	the	motivational	force	of	the	underdetermination	in	pushing	us	to	avoid	all	the	above	philosophical	‘to	and	fro’	and	to	drop	the	commitment	to	objects	to	begin	with.	Of	course,	shifting	to	a	structuralist	ontology	does	not	obviate	the	need	for	some	metaphysical	explication	and	the	above	‘spectrum’	running	from	‘shallow’	to	‘deeper’	forms	of	realism	can	still	be	invoked.	Indeed,	on	an	autobiographical																																																									19	Norton	suggests	that	we	might	interpret	entangled	states	as	representing	‘emergent	unities’	(2015	p.	1198)	but	it	is	not	clear	what	this	could	mean	(cf.	Howard	1989).		
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note,	back	in	the	early	days	of	the	ontic	structural	realist	project,	when	asked	‘what	is	this	thing	called	structure?’	I	would	point	to	some	expression	of	the	relevant	piece	of	physics	–	such	as	the	commutation	relation	between	the	particle	permutation	operator	and	the	Hamiltonian	for	a	system,	expressing	the	role	of	permutation	symmetry	–	and	bluntly	state	‘It’s	that!’.	Justifiably,	perhaps,	this	was	felt	to	be	an	unsatisfactory	response,	not	least	because	it	generated	the	impression	that	the	structure	to	which	commitment	was	being	invited	was	mathematical	structure	and	that	ontic	structural	realists	were	Platonists	(for	a	response	see	French	and	Ladyman	2003).			 Subsequently,	the	above	‘rummaging	in	the	toolbox’	methodology	has	been	deployed,	twice	over,	as	it	were:	first	to	history,	drawing	on	the	structuralist	developments	of	Cassirer	and	Eddington	that	were	‘effaced’	in	the	standard	expositions	of	structural	realism.	Thus,	appropriating	Cassirer’s	framework,	the	structure	of	the	world	is	envisaged	as	a	kind	of	‘Parmenidean	sphere’	consisting	of	symmetry	principles,	laws	and	definite	measurement	outcomes,	standing	–	metaphysically	at	least	–	in	a	non-hierarchical	relationship	(French	2014).	One	can	then	fill	in	that	template	in	a	number	of	ways.20	So,	for	example,	one	might	adopt	a	Humean	form	of	structuralism,	according	to	which	those	laws	that	feature	in	our	best	theories	are	nothing	but	expressions	of	the	fundamental	regularities	that	effectively,	but	only	partly,	constitute	the	world.	I	say	‘only	partly’	because	the	Humean	faces	certain	difficulties	in	accommodating	symmetries	(Mckenzie	2014b)	although	steps	have	been	taken	to	overcome	these	(Duguid	2017).			 Alternatively,	one	could	acknowledge	the	role	of	modality	in	the	world	and	incorporate	‘powers’	or	dispositions	into	this	picture,	but	with	the	‘seat’	of	such	powers	being	not	objects	per	se,	but	the	structure	itself.	Again	the	nature	of	symmetry	principles	presents	an	obstacle	to	the	adoption	of	the	standard	characterisation	of	such	dispositions	in	terms	of	the	‘stimulus	and	manifestation’	condition,	forcing	the	appropriation	of	some	other	device	from	the	metaphysicians’	toolbox,	such	as	‘potentiality’	(see	French	2020b).			 Finally,	one	could	adopt	the	view	that	the	laws	are	primitively	modal	(Maudlin	2007)	and	extend	this	to	the	structure	of	the	world	as	a	whole	(French	2014).	Thus	Permutation	Symmetry	may	be	considered	to	be	inherently	modal	in	the	sense	that	it	encodes	a	whole	range	of	possibilities,	including	those	corresponding	to	‘parastatistics’	as	well	as	the	more	commonly	discussed	bosonic	and	fermionic	forms	discussed	here	(French	1987).	In	one	sense,	of	course,	this	sits	close	to	the	dispositionalists’	account,	insofar	as	it	accepts	modality	‘into’	the	world;	but	in	another,	it	is	not	so	distant	from	Humeanism	in	that	it	too	denies	any	‘governing’	role	for	laws	and	symmetries	and	effectively	identifies	them	with	features	of	(the	structure	of)	the	world.21		
																																																								20	This	template	can	be	seen	as	one	way	of	understanding	the	‘Big	Tent’	structuralism	pursued	in	French	2014,	with	the	different	‘fillings	in’	as	different	denizens	living	within	the	tent!			21	One	might	worry	that	one	underdetermination	has	been	avoided	only	to	introduce	another	here!	However,	the	two	forms	are	different	insofar	as	these	alternative	‘fillings	in’	of	the	structuralist	template	are	not	equivalent	to	the	two	kinds	of	‘individuality	profile’	for	objects.	The	former	are	independent	of	the	notion	of	structure	itself	and	hence	the	eliminativist	argument	does	not	get	a	toe-hold.	Once	again,	thanks	to	Claudio	Calosi	for	encouraging	me	to	be	clear	on	this.	
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	 Of	course,	this	world	is	actual,	not	possible	and	so	the	structure	of	this	world	is	not	wholly	modal	–	the	possibilities	represented	by	parastatistics	do	not	appear	to	be	actualised,	for	example.	In	this	regard,	Bose-Einstein	and	Fermi-Dirac	statistics	can	be	thought	of	as	‘existential	witnesses’	(Wilson	2012)	to	the	actuality	of	this	world.	This	brings	us	to	our	second	use	of	the	methodology	of	‘rummaging	in	the	toolbox’,	but	this	time	the	box	is	full	of	metaphysical	devices22:	we	can	capture	the	relationship	between	Permutation	Symmetry,	say,	and	the	standard	forms	of	quantum	statistics	in	terms	of	that	which	holds	between	determinables	and	determinates	(French	2014;	see	also	French	2019).	Generalising	this	to	the	other	fundamental	symmetries	we	can	capture	the	relationship	between	these	and	the	fundamental	properties	of	particles,	offering	a	‘top	down’	approach	to	the	structuralist	reconceptualisation	of	quantum	particles	(French	2014).			 That	accommodates	the	various	particle	kinds	but	still	leaves	the	relationship	between	symmetries,	laws	and	definite	measurement	outcomes	to	be	accounted	for.	The	approach	taken	to	this	will	in	part	depend	on	one’s	chosen	solution	to	the	infamous	measurement	problem	and	again	in	the	spirit	of	a	‘Big	Tent’	approach	to	structuralism,	one	could	delineate	different	forms	depending	on	which	interpretation	of	quantum	mechanics	is	adopted.23	The	Everettian	interpretation,	for	example,	is	perhaps	most	obviously	compatible	with	structural	realism	(Wallace	2003)	but	it	is	not	so	hard	to	perceive	how	the	‘probability	field’	of	(some	understandings	of)	the	GRW	approach	could	also	be	given	a	structuralist	gloss;	and	despite	appearances,	even	the	Bohmian	line	might	be	amenable	to	similar	treatment	(French	2001).	In	effect	this	is	to	acknowledge,	that	even	if	one	accepts	the	move	to	structure	as	a	way	of	resolving	the	metaphysical	underdetermination,	there	is	a	further	underdetermination	to	deal	with	as	represented	by	these	(and	other)	different	interpretations	of	the	theory.	Resolving	that	requires	consideration	of	a	further	array	of	factors	that	I	can’t	consider	here	(see	the	papers	in	French	and	Saatsi	2020).	
 Finally,	there	is	still	something	else	that	should	be	accommodated	by	this	filling	in	of	the	structuralist	template	that	hasn’t	yet	been	considered:	entanglement,	regarded	by	Schrödinger,	famously,	as	‘…the	characteristic	trait	of	quantum	mechanics	’	(1935,	p.	555).	This	is	typically	characterised	in	terms	of	the	non-factorisability	of	the	relevant	wave	function	representing	the	state	of	two	(or	more)	systems	that	have	interacted	(ibid.,	p.	556).	However,	as	has	been	noted	(see,	for	example,	Ladyman,	Linnebo	and	Bigaj	2013)	some	care	must	be	taken	here:	anti-symmetrised	states	such	as	the	fermionic	singlet	state	discussed	above	are	also	non-factorisable24	but	do	not	exhibit	the	problematic	empirical	consequences	typically	associated	with	entanglement	such	as	measurement																																																									22	Glick	suggests	that	ontic	structural	realism	should	be	understood	as	a	‘meta-metaphysical’	stance	in	the	sense	of	acknowledging	that	metaphysics	is	simply	not	capable	of	providing	us	with	an	appropriate	notion	of	fundamental	structure	and	that	this	can	only	be	achieved	through	mathematical	representation.	This	does	allow	a	role	for	metaphysics	but	only	as	‘pragmatically’	illuminating	the	structure	of	the	world	for	the	practical	purposes	of	communication,	say.	Here	I	am	suggesting	that	metaphysics	can	play	a	more	profound	role	in	offering	some	understanding	of	this	structure.		23	This	is	why	the	criticism	that	the	ontic	structural	realist	has	not	given	her	own	solution	to	the	measurement	problem	is	perhaps	a	little	unfair	(Esfeld	2015)!	24	Certain	symmetrised	states	are	also	non-factorisable	but	others,	corresponding	to	the	arrangements	of	two	bosons	in	the	same	state,	do	not	manifest	entanglement.	
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correlations	that	violate	the	famous	Bell	inequalities.	Thus	the	ontic	structural	realist	cannot	accommodate	entanglement	by	simply	folding	it	into	the	role	of	Permutation	Symmetry,	say.			 One	option	would	be	to	extend	the	relationalist	approach	hinted	at	above	from	the	fermionic	singlet	state	to	entangled	states	in	the	latter	sense.	However	this	immediately	runs	afoul	of	the	afore-mentioned	concerns	as	to	whether	the	relevant	mathematical	expression	can	even	be	taken	to	represent	a	relation	to	begin	with	(for	consideration	of	these	concerns	in	the	specific	context	of	entanglement,	see	Calosi	and	Morganti	forthcoming).	And	of	course,	if	such	relations	were	taken	to	underpin	‘weak	discernibility’,	understood	as	grounding	the	individuality	of	the	particles,	then	even	if	it	could	be	pulled	off,	such	a	move	would	only	work	for	so-called	‘moderate’	forms	of	ontic	structural	realism	that	still	allow	some	role	for	objects	(even	a	much	attenuated	one;	for	criticisms	see	French	2014	pp.	178-180).			 Furthermore,	even	if	the	above	concerns	are	put	aside,	and	the	relevant	expressions	are	understood	as	representing	relations,	and	it	is	acknowledged	that	this	approach	would	only	work	for	certain	forms	of	structural	realism,	there	remains	the	issue	of	accommodating	the	relationship	between	the	relevant	relation	and	the	particles,	where	the	former	yields	the	weak	discernibility	of	the	latter.	One	might	dive	into	the	metaphysicans’	toolbox	yet	again	and	appeal	to	some	form	of	dependence	here	(French	2010).	However,	insofar	as	the	relevant	states	can	be	expressed	in	terms	of	different	observables,	such	as	spin	or	position,	say,	so	that	different	relations	are	in	play,	the	form	of	dependence	will	be	only	‘generic’	in	the	sense	that	it	does	not	pick	out	which	is	the	ontologically	fundamental	relation	(McKenzie	2014a;	Calosi	and	Morganti	forthcoming).	Here	perhaps	the	issue	of	which	is	one’s	favoured	interpretation	intrudes	again:	the	structuralist	Bohmian	(if	there	is	such	a	beast!)	would	certainly	argue	for	position	relations	being	fundamental	(on	the	usual	grounds	that	all	measurements	are	ultimately	position	measurements)	and	construct	all	other	observables,	including	spin,	from	those.	Alternatively,	one	could	agree	that	position	is	fundamental	in	this	sense	but	decline	to	engage	in	the	Bohmian	construction,	noting	instead	that	we	can	understand	spin	as	a	determinate	of	Poincaré	symmetry.	There	is,	as	critics	have	noted,	further	work	to	be	done	(Calosi	and	Morganti	ibid.).		 Another	device	might	be	that	of	non-supervenience,	already	mentioned	above	and	originally	introduced	precisely	to	offer	a	new	metaphysical	understanding	of	entanglement	within	a	broadly	relationalist	framework	(Teller	1986).	Indeed,	this	was	cited	in	Ladyman’s	classic	work	on	ontic	structural	realism	(Ladyman	1998)	as	a	further	motivation	for	shifting	to	a	structuralist	stance.	Again,	however,	this	seems	best	suited	to	the	‘moderate’	forms	insofar	as	‘non-supervenience’	is	cashed	out,	negatively,	in	terms	of	the	relevant	relations	not	supervening	(surprise	surprise!)	on	the	intrinsic	or	other	properties	of	the	particles;	indeed,	as	also	already	noted,	it	has	been	taken	to	mesh	nicely	with	the	particles-as-individuals	package	(French	1989b).			 Presumably	non-supervenience	in	this	case	would	also	be	dismissed	as	‘generic’	but	one	could	make	the	same	sort	of	move	as	above	and	obtain	the	different	kinds	of	non-supervenient	relations	by	appealing	to,	for	example,	the	way	certain	properties	‘drop	out’	of	the	relevant	symmetry.	This	move	perhaps	offers	one	way	of	meeting	the	challenge	that	‘…	we	need	to	be	told	what	exactly	
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the	physical	content	of	the	relevant	relations	is,	which	observables	the	correlated	quantum	objects	depend	on.’	(Calosi	and	Morganti	forthcoming).	Nevertheless,	if	one	is	uncomfortable	with	such	metaphysical	devices,	one	might	simply	take	the	structure	of	the	world	to	be	represented,	in	part,	by	Hilbert	space,	as	again	alluded	to	in	Ladyman’s	original	piece	(1998).25	So,	we	recall	that	the	standard	way	of	representing	the	states	of	systems	is	in	terms	of	the	tensor	product	Hilbert	space.	The	action	of	Permutation	Symmetry	then	divides	that	space	into	different	‘symmetrised’	sectors	–	with	two	particles,	only	two	sectors	are	possible,	namely	the	antisymmetric	and	symmetric,	corresponding	to	fermions	and	bosons	respectively	of	course	but	for	three	or	more	particles	other	sectors	become	available,	corresponding	to	paraparticles	which,	as	already	mentioned,	do	not	appear	to	exist	in	this	world.	The	fermionic	singlet	state	underpinning	the	attribution	of	weak	discernibility	has	the	characteristics	that	it	does	by	virtue	of	falling	within	the	anti-symmetric	sector.			 This	still	does	not	accommodate	the	empirically	more	interesting	form	of	entanglement	but	again,	what	the	structuralist	says	on	this	may	depend	on	certain	other	interpretational	moves.	So,	for	example,	for	Hilbert	spaces	of	dimension	greater	than	three,	the	Kochen-Specker	theorem	holds,	which	means	that,	putting	things	negatively,	the	structure	of	the	world	is	such	that	it	is	impossible	to	assign	values	to	all	physical	quantities	whilst,	at	the	same	time,	preserving	the	functional	relations	between	them	(Isham	and	Butterfield	1998).	In	effect,	the	theorem	requires	any	no-hidden-variables	interpretation	of	quantum	theory	to	be	contextual.	Likewise,	one	can	understand	Bell’s	Theorem	as	ruling	out	any	local	hidden	variables	theory	and	given	that	this	has	been	described	as	‘the	most	profound	discovery	in	science’	(Stapp	1975,	p.	271),	the	structuralist	might	be	justified	in	taking	it	to	represent	a	fundamental	feature	of	the	structure	of	the	world.	Characterising	that	feature	more	positively	however	bumps	up	against	the	afore-mentioned	interpretational	attitudes,	as	an	Everettian	will	have	a	very	different	view	of	what	the	theorem	tells	us	than	the	Bohmian,	say.	All	of	this	is	to	acknowledge	that	there	is	indeed	more	work	to	be	done	(again	see	Calosi	and	Morganti)	but	in	fairness,	insofar	as	it	involves	such	attitudes,	it	is	work	that	the	non-structuralist	has	to	do	as	well!		 		
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